Travis Sharp, an expert on United States defense policy, says that China’s economic growth and military modernization are “tipping the East Asian balance of power more in Beijing’s favor.”

To gain insight into the relative hard power of states, I interviewed Mr. Sharp about US military strategies. Mr. Sharp is a military policy analyst for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC.

He says that the United States is “leading the charge” on the international increase in defense spending, but America’s “military strategy and spending are not always driven by factors related to US security and power.” The global rise in spending is due to “perceived threats or politics.” When surveying the international security landscape, countries see “more sources of potential danger than ever before.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently proposed changes to the defense budget for fiscal year 2010. While Senator John McCain welcomed the proposal as a “major step in the right direction,” others worry that the changes are “disarming America.” What are your impressions?

The “disarming America” accusation is easily refuted by some math.

I believe Secretary Gates recommendations are pretty close to budget neutral for fiscal year 2010. As I show here, if you add the Obama administration’s proposed defense budget increase from last year ($21 billion) to Gates’s proposed reductions (I estimate $10 billion), you get approximately $31 billion in “free money” for the Obama administration to play with. But Gates also proposed around $21 billion in budget increases. When you combine those increases with the numerous personnel benefits that we can’t yet put a price tag on, you are likely in the neighborhood of $30 billion in new initiatives. So everything Gates allegedly “cut” was offset by increases for things the Obama administration believes are more important.

Call it “reform,” call it “rearrangement” – hell, call it a “modest course correction” – just don’t call it “disarming America” because it’s not. The bottom line is that President Obama is not reducing overall defense spending this year. But he is rearranging it in ways that I believe are long overdue.

You recently wrote that the Pentagon’s budget “is larger in inflation-adjusted terms than at any time since World War II.” The United States is also the world’s largest military spender, by far. Do you think this spending is necessary to maintain security? Is the spending needed to preserve America’s relative global power?

In my opinion, US military strategy and spending are not always driven by factors related to US security and power. What do I mean by that? I mean that factors other than threat and national interest, the proper criteria for defense policy decisions, distort the policymaking process and lead to less efficient (aka more expensive) outcomes. I call the purveyors of these non-strategic factors “non-strategic influencers,” and I would offer as examples members of Congress, defense contractors, inter-service rivalries and interest groups.

I believe the existence of these non-strategic influencers calls into question the premise that every dollar we spend on defense is absolutely essential for US security. Let’s be honest: a lot of things besides rational threat-based assessments go into determining how much the United States spends on defense.

Of course, non-strategic influencers are part of living in a democracy. Interestingly enough, I think less democratic countries, such as Russia and China, probably have military budgets that are purer reflections of strategic calculation than the United States. Since these countries don’t fully disclose details about their budgets, however, the United States is left with great uncertainty about their aims and must make educated guesses much of the time. These guesses, not surprisingly, tend to round up when it comes time to ask for budgetary resources.

The most obvious example of a non-strategic influencer is Congress. There can be little doubt that members of Congress often make decisions about defense spending based on what will most benefit their constituents, not what will most benefit the entire nation. I don’t begrudge them their parochialism; indeed, they were elected by a geographically-limited group of people to represent that limited group’s interests on Capitol Hill. But the addition of billions of lawmaker-inserted defense dollars each year is not done in a strategic fashion. It increases the overall budget in a way that I believe is artificial and not reflective of the threats facing the United States.

Several US officials have spoken about smart power and the need to balance hard and soft capabilities. Do you think the US should place a greater emphasis on America’s soft power?

Yes. I believe US policymakers excessively dichotomize foreign and defense policy, when in reality they should be considered as a more unified whole. I, and many others, believe we have underfunded nuclear nonproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, border security, foreign assistance, economic development and diplomacy in recent years. I don’t believe more funding for these elements of smart power will rid the world of danger – the United States will be called on to use force in the future – but they may help prevent problems before they start. Moreover, the money required to dramatically boost funding for smart power will not even put a dent in the Pentagon budget. At risk of oversimplification, the United States can either buy one additional F-22 Raptor or pay the salaries of 2,860 new Foreign Service Officers. I think both expenditures are an investment in US security, and I feel pretty safe with the 187 Raptors we’ve already got.

Looking at the bigger picture, I believe the creeping infiltration of the American military into all aspects of US foreign policy is cause for concern. According to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, DOD provided four percent of overall US development aid assistance in 1998; by 2005, its share had risen to 22 percent. Besides my fears about militarizing diplomacy, the practical reality is that the US military is incapable of accomplishing everything that currently is being asked of it. From counterinsurgency to nationbuilding to reconciling tribal grievances, the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the limits of DOD’s willingness to assume any burden. The American military’s “can-do” attitude must not obscure the fact that it cannot do everything. It must prioritize what it is good at: fighting and winning the nation’s wars.

In March, the Defense Department released its most recent report on China’s military. Many in the US worry that improvements in China’s military are changing the regional balance of power. What are your thoughts?

There is no doubt that China’s economic growth – and concomitant military modernization – is tipping the East Asian balance of power more in Beijing’s favor. Newly ascendant holders of regional and international power are natural, not to be feared, and something the United States better get used to in the 21st century.

From a military strategy perspective, however, I do sometimes worry that the United States is playing right into Chinese hands. China’s military planning is based on an anti-access/area-denial (AA/AD) strategy whereby the People’s Liberation Army would be able to threaten US carriers, surface combatants, and other ships in the western Pacific as far out as the second island chain running south from Japan to New Guinea. To achieve AA/AD, China is acquiring new aircraft, submarines, and missiles, including anti-ship ballistic missiles that could threaten US carriers up to 1,200 miles away.

In light of China’s AA/DD buildup, the name of the game for the United States is long range capability. However, did you hear a lot of yelling and screaming this week about Secretary Gates’s decision to delay a new long-range (conventionally-armed) Air Force bomber? No, not even a peep. All you heard about was the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, two planes that would have problems reaching military targets in China’s interior. Not that these aircraft aren’t valuable; they certainly are. But to beat Chinese AA/AD, the United States will likely have to look at technologies like the naval unmanned combat air system, which would, as incoming Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work wrote last year, “transform a US aircraft carrier from a system with unlimited global mobility but relatively short tactical reach into a multipurpose global reconnaissance-strike platform.”

Sadly, for non-strategic influencers such as Congress and defense contractors, these types of debates are often secondary to short-term political or proprietary considerations.

Even with the international economic crisis, military spending is on the rise around the world? Why? Is there any danger the high expenditures will spur a global arms race?

When it comes to increased military spending, the United States is leading the charge. At $534 billion, President Obama’s Pentagon budget is $9 billion, or 1.7 percent, greater than the previous year’s budget after adjusting for inflation. China also announced it would increase its 2009 defense budget, up 15 percent over last year’s level. India said its increase would be a staggering 34 percent. France plans to double its domestic arms purchases to $26 billion in 2009. And Russia plans to spend $111 billion on military modernization by 2011, at which point President Dmitry Medvedev said even more accelerated “large-scale rearming” would begin.

I think it has been pretty well-documented that states increase their defense spending because of either perceived threats or politics, whether domestic or international.

On the issue of threats, I think countries surveying the global security landscape today see more sources of potential danger than ever before. From the recent ascendance of previously inward-focused countries such as China and India, to the rise of non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and pirate gangs, to the new threats emanating from cyberterrorists, to nuclear weapon and missile proliferation, today’s threats are very different from those encountered during the Cold War. Moreover, nations’ fear is easy to act upon in today’s globalized international defense market, where armaments can be obtained from various state and private sources.

On the issue of politics, having already touched on domestic non-strategic influencers previously, I’ll just briefly address the international arena. The dilemma that accompanies increased military expenditures is pretty straightforward: the more a country spends on its military, the less safe it is likely to feel because its pursuit of increased military capabilities will trigger in-kind militarization by other states. Government spending on defense is not like government spending on infrastructure, health care, or education because spending more on road signs or textbooks does not make Russia nervous, but spending more on attack submarines does.

This is the root of my problem with the “defense spending as stimulus” argument. I think Kenneth Waltz put it best: “Defense spending…is unproductive for all and unavoidable for most. Rather than increased well-being, their reward is in the maintenance of their autonomy.” The kicker, in my mind, is that every dollar we spend on defense above and beyond what is necessary to protect US security and national interests actually becomes counterproductive and threatens our autonomy due to the arms race repercussions I just outlined. The key is a balanced approach that spends whatever is required for current and future challenges but doesn’t willfully ignore the impact US defense budgets have on the calculations of other states.

Photo from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The discussions were imperfect and the actions were inadequate, but it was better that they met than not. Last week, leaders representing nearly 90 percent of the global economy convened to solve the world’s economic ills. There were no absolute remedies offered, but did the Group of 20 summit address the hopes of rising powers?

Emerging powers benefited from changes in financial supervision and regulation and promises to reform financial institutions. As expected, the Financial Stability Forum was officially expanded and renamed. In the final communiqué, leaders committed to:

“Establish a new Financial Stability Board with a strengthened mandate, as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), including all G20 countries, FSF members, Spain and the European Commission.”

Leaders pledged to give a stronger voice in the world financial order to rising powers by changing members’ voting shares in the International Monetary Fund. But, arduous negotiations lie ahead if the quotas are going to accurately reflect the global balance of economic power.

“We will reform their mandates, scope and governance to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalization, and that emerging and developing economies, including the poorest, must have greater voice and representation…

“To this end: we commit to implementing the package of IMF quota and voice reforms agreed in April 2008 and call on the IMF to complete the next review of quotas by January 2011.”

Before the London summit, financial ministers from Brazil, Russia, India and China called for the heads of the IMF and World Bank to be selected “irrespective of nationality.” Although not as strong, the final G20 statement was clearly a nod in this direction.

“We agree that the heads and senior leadership of the international financial institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based selection process.”

During the press conference after the summit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke positively about the agreement and his personal meetings with other world leaders.

Clip from the London Summit.

Show throwing is quickly becoming a popular form of protest. Both former United States President George W. Bush and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao previously fell victim. This week, Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram became the latest world leader to enjoy the dubious distinction of having a shoe thrown at him.

If it’s a sign of a country’s power, politicians in Brazil and Russia should watch out for flying shoes.

Photo from Ivan Sekretarev/AP. Hat tip from Joshua Keating.

I’m reading another review of President Obama’s trip to Europe, this one by Michael Shear and Kevin Sullivan writing in The Washington Post. I would recommend it for the casual reader, it’s balanced (noting comments from the both sides of the political spectrum) and it summarizes the highlights of the trip, allowing the reader to gain a quick recap of what happened on the way from London to Baghdad.

I’m starting to get the sense that the trip was a great success for Obama personally and for the image of the U.S. abroad, but it was something of a draw in terms of the substance of the trip. In the win column I would note that the U.S. was able to reboot the Bretton Woods-era financial institutions to deal with the global economic crisis rather than creating a new international financial regulatory system as France and Germany wanted; deflected talk of creating a new international reserve currency to replace the dollar, as suggested by Russia and China; announced plans with Russia to renegotiate key arms control treaties and then announced the lofty goal of working towards a world free of nuclear weapons (though, to be fair, other presidents have set this as an aspirational goal, the logical endpoint of the arms control treaties); announced new initiatives aimed at fostering closer ties with China; and, finally, continued to leverage Obama’s indecision on European missile defense to gain goodwill from both Russia and Eastern European countries (particularly impressed with the diplomatic finesse demonstrated here).

In the loss column I’d have to note that the U.S. failed to gain support from the G20 for a additional stimulus spending; and, at the NATO summit, the U.S. failed to gain allied support for additional combat troops for Afghanistan. I see that last item as the most glaring failure. I can’t help wonder how future historians will characterize this first presidential trip. If we call it a success are we being blinded by all the outstanding photo ops and demonstrations of Obama’s great personal popularity? If we note the failure to gain more combat troops from NATO and say this signaled a watershed for both NATO and the war in Afghanistan, are we being too pessimistic? Perhaps it is enough to say that the trip went well, there were  no major mistakes and the U.S. scored a few wins and a few losses, but on balance it was a good trip for the new president.

United States President Barack Obama enjoys the number one ranking in both popularity and influence of the world’s leaders, according to a recent poll conducted by Harris Interactive for France 24 and the International Herald Tribune. The survey measured the views of adults in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United States.

Leaders of rising powers, including Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao, are recognized for their global influence.

Image from France 24.

2. The global financial crisis pushed the G20 to the fore and next week the grouping will take center stage. Many hope the solutions for the economic crisis – developing new financial regulations, coordinating stimulus packages, reforming financial institutions and preventing protectionism, trade wars and “deglobalization” – will be born in London.

In many ways, the G20 is the forum of the future. Other groups, particularly the G7 or G8, cannot adequately address transnational threats and there is a growing recognition that emerging economies and rising powers deserve (and need) a seat at the table. The G20 may not equally represent all regions and views or accurately reflect the international balance of power, but it peacefully incorporates new powers into the existing world order.

Critics warn that the G20 is too large and unwieldy to solve the world’s ills. They worry that there will be too many voices unwilling to compromise narrow national interests. After all, the G20 is a politically expedient option. Old powers are not traded for new ones – all are included. This means that any future group may be smaller than the Group of 20.

So where does that leave us today? Should we simply temper expectations for the summit?

The success of any global response increasingly relies on the leadership of Washington and Beijing. Last year, C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs advocating for a G2 approach “to steer the global governance process.”

“Effective systemic defenses against international economic challenges in today’s world must start with active cooperation between its two dominant economies, the United States and China.”

Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, and Justin Yifu Lin, the Bank’s chief economist and senior vice president, recently added that “without a strong G2, the G20 will disappoint.”

The meeting next week between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao on the summit’s sidelines will be just as important (if not more) as the G20 meeting itself.

Image from the Council on Foreign Relations.

14. With Russia rearming and China continuing to modernize its armed forces, it is easy to forget that America’s military spending is more than the next 14 biggest countries combined.

Graphic from the Economist.